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Comparative Method and 
International Litigation 
Ronald A. Brand* 
Unlike most of the other subjects in the law school curriculum, 
Comparative Law is not a body of rules and principles.  It is a method, a 
way of looking at legal problems.  Strictly speaking, the term Comparative 
Law is a misnomer.  It would be more logical to speak of the Comparative 
Method.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
If we apply comparative method to international litigation, what lessons may 
we learn?  I suggest the answer depends on the where, the what, and the how.  Where 
we stand when we look at the law matters.  What law we look at matters.  How we 
look at the law matters.  Thus, I begin by revealing where I stand when I apply a 
comparative look at international litigation, what law I look at through this method, 
and how I propose to look at that law. 
Each of us has the perspective of a participant in a given legal system.  That 
perspective constitutes the where and is a common factor in comparative analysis.  
In addition to being trained in and practicing in the U.S. legal system, I have had 
the privilege of being involved for over twenty–five years in the work of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law (“HCCH”).  I have been a member of the 
U.S. Delegation to the Hague Conference for the Working Groups, Special 
Commissions, and Diplomatic Sessions that produced both the 2005 Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the 2019 Hague Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.  For 
the first half of that period of time, until the conclusion of the 2005 Convention, I 
had the further privilege of working closely with one of the great comparative 
method scholars of the now–past generation, Professor Arthur von Mehren.2  While 
I was never able to take a formal course with Arthur, our work together that 
culminated in the Choice of Court Convention was, for me, the equivalent of a most 
wonderful seminar—as it was for many of those who shared the opportunity to work 
 
 
*  Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg University Professor, John E. Murray Faculty Scholar, and 
Director, Center for International Legal Education, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
 1. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET. AL., COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed. 1970).  While I was not fortunate 
enough to study “Comparative Law” under Rudi, he was my professor for Civil Procedure—a basic 
course in U.S. law, during which every one of his students came to understand the importance of 
comparative method for studying the law.  In the 1960s and early 1970s, the vast majority of students at 
Cornell Law School took Professor Schlesinger’s course in Comparative Law in their second year of law 
school, quite often reporting that it was in that course that they really came to understand U.S. civil 
procedure.  Unfortunately, mandatory retirement policies of the time resulted in Professor Schlesinger 
leaving Cornell after my first year of law school, and my Comparative Law course (albeit a good one) 
was not the course taught by Professor Schlesinger.  Taking my lead from Rudolph Schlesinger, I chose 
to title my comments using “comparative method” rather than “comparative law.” 
 2. Elaine McArdle, Arthur T. von Mehren: A Comparative Scholar Beyond Compare, HARVARD 
LAW TODAY (Apr. 23, 2006), https://today.law.harvard.edu/arthur-t-von-mehren-1922-2006/. 
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with Arthur on that project.  Beginning with Arthur’s initial paper,3 the project 
originally aimed at producing a global convention on jurisdiction and judgments 
recognition resulted in the 2005 and 2019 Conventions.  This allowed me to see the 
process of comparative development of the law in a very special way.  It is from 
that vantage point that this Article must be understood. 
I turn next to what law I propose to study comparatively.  The panel from which 
this Article originated had three speakers assigned three topics: litigation, 
arbitration, and mediation.  It might be logical given these topics to compare each 
of these three areas of the law with the other two.  That is not my approach here. 
Though I have taught a course titled transnational litigation, my bread and 
butter has been a course in international business transactions (“IBT”).  But, in part 
because of my “seminar” with Professor von Mehren during the Hague 
negotiations, my IBT course is largely built around rules of jurisdiction, applicable 
law, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments.  These are the three pillars 
of private international law, making up what in the United States is taught under the 
rubric of conflict of laws.  The law of jurisdiction, applicable law, and judgments 
recognition is probably most often taught in a litigation context, and that would 
perhaps be most appropriate given my topic and title.  Nonetheless, that law has as 
much or more importance to the transaction planning lawyer as to the litigator, and 
it affects my focus here for comparative study of developments both in the Hague 
Conference process and in national (and regional) legal systems during the 
negotiation of the two treaties with which I have been involved. 
One factor that is perhaps most important to the transactional use of the law, 
which then becomes quite relevant at the litigation stage, is party autonomy: the 
extent to which the law allows, and the extent to which private parties take 
advantage of, their ability to determine where jurisdiction exists to hear a dispute, 
as well as what law will apply to that dispute.  Party autonomy is important to 
private international law, and state limitations on party autonomy often determine 
the ability of private parties to enter into mutually beneficial relationships. 
Finally, a word about the how in my comparative analysis.  This really is the 
method question.  At its most basic level, comparative method in the study of law 
brings us to the question: “How does the law of country X compare to the law of 
country Y?”  Such an approach can be very useful, both in enhancing one’s 
understanding of the law of either country being compared and in understanding 
assumptions fundamental to any legal system.  My approach here, however, is a bit 
different and results from where I stand when I engage in this comparative analysis.  
I thus will look not only at domestic law, but also at treaties and other international 
legal instruments—the comparative evolution of the law.  Moreover, I will look at 
and compare legal systems as well as legal rules—the comparative evolution of the 
institutions that make the law. 
When considering the 2005 and 2019 Hague Conventions, it is useful first to 
engage in a comparison of the most influential legal systems at the start of the 
negotiations.  The differences resulting from that comparison ultimately affected 
the focus of the negotiations and the text of the resulting legal instruments and thus 
are examined in Section II.  In Section III, I then discuss the development over the 
 
 3. Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition Convention Study: Final Report, accompanying Letter of May 
5, 1992 from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Georges Droz, 
Secretary General, The Hague Conference on Private International Law (May 5, 1992) (distributed with 
Hague Conference document L.c. ON No. 15 (92)). 
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relevant time of the European Union (“E.U.”) legal institutions that affected the law 
on jurisdiction and the recognition of foreign judgments, followed in Section IV  by 
a comparison of developments in the law itself in both the E.U. and the U.S.  Finally, 
in Sections IV and V, I compare the law in the two legal systems and provide 
conclusions based on those comparisons, including thoughts about how the 
institutions and laws in the two systems affected negotiations at the Hague 
Conference. 
II.  THE CONTEXT: THE HISTORY OF THE                                                     
HAGUE CONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONS4 
A.  From the First Request to the 2005                                                  
Choice of Court Convention 
In order to understand more clearly where I stand when I view the law of 
international litigation, it is necessary to provide a brief history of the negotiations 
at the HCCH on matters of jurisdiction and judgments recognition. 
In 1992, the United States proposed to the Hague Conference that it take up the 
negotiation of a multilateral convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments.5  After consideration by a Working Group in October of 1992,6 the 
Seventeenth Session of the Hague Conference referred the matter to Special 
Commission in May of 1993,7 and in October of 1996, it was decided to include the 
matter on the Agenda of the Nineteenth Session of the Hague Conference.8  Formal 
negotiations then occurred at Special Commission meetings in June of 1997,9 
March of 1998,10 and November of 1998.11  The November 1998 session produced 
a draft document, which was considered further during two weeks in June and one 
week in October of 1999, resulting in a Preliminary Draft Convention text.12 
 
 4. See RONALD A. BRAND & PAUL M. HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF 
COURT AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS (ADVENTURES IN TREATY INTERPRETATION) 
6–10 (2008). 
 5. Letter of May 5, 1992 from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to 
Georges Droz, Secretary General, The Hague Conference on Private International Law (May 5, 1992) 
(distributed with Hague Conference document L.c. ON No. 15 (92))). 
 6. Conclusions of the Working Group Meeting on Enforcement of Judgments, HCCH, Doc. L.c. ON 
No. 2 (93). 
 7. Peter H. Pfund, HCCH: Final Act of the 17th Session, Including the Convention on Protection of 
Children and Co–Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 32 I.L.M. 1134 (1993). 
 8. HCCH, Proceedings of the Eighteenth Session 30 September to 19 October, Annex to the Minutes 
of the Opening Session 21 (1999), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/9a3b542c-4d99-403a-9fbd-
c40f537b6ff0.pdf. 
 9. Catherine Kessedjian, Synthesis of the Work of the Special Commission of June 1997 on 
International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters , 
HCCH, Prel. Doc. No. 8 (Nov. 1997), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/ecc45930-f5a1-4bd1-b94c-
420c44a05954.pdf. 
 10. See Catherine Kessedjian, Synthesis of the Work of the Special Commission of March 1998 on 
International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters  11, 
HCCH, Prel. Doc. No. 9 (July 1998), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd9.pdf. 
 11. HCCH, Special Commission on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters 1, Working Document No. 144 (Nov. 1998), 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/1be05729-3132-43be-89c3-82be3fdb2224.pdf. 
 12. The text of the Preliminary Draft Convention is available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/dr
aft36e.html. 
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The Diplomatic Conference, originally contemplated for fall 2000, was delayed 
after concerns expressed by the U.S.  This resulted in a decision to split the 
Diplomatic Conference into two parts.  The first part of the Conference was held in 
June 2001, resulting in a new Interim Text.13  Problems in reaching substantial 
agreement resulted in a decision in April of 2002, by Commission I of the 
Nineteenth Session of the Conference, to establish an informal working group to 
consider the best path forward.  In March 2003, that group produced a draft text of 
a choice of court convention.14  After further Special Commission sessions, a 
Diplomatic Conference, held as Commission II of the Twentieth Session of the 
HCCH in June of 2005, completed the 2005 Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements.15 
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements went into effect for 
Mexico and the E.U. (for twenty–seven of its Member States) on October 1, 2015;16 
for Singapore on October 1, 2016; for Montenegro on August 1, 2018; and for 
Denmark on September 1, 2018.17  The People’s Republic of China, Ukraine, and 
the U.S. have signed but have not ratified the Convention.18 
The Choice of Court Convention contains three basic rules: Article 5 provides 
that a court chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction; Article 6 provides that a court not chosen shall defer to the chosen 
court; and Article 8 provides that the courts of all contracting states shall recognize 
and enforce judgments from a court chosen in an exclusive choice of court 
agreement, subject to an explicit list of bases for non–recognition found in Article 
9.19  Thus, the 2005 Convention is both a jurisdiction convention—limited to one 
basis of jurisdiction, consent to exclusive dispute settlement in the courts of one 
state—and a judgments convention—providing for circulation of judgments from 
cases based on exclusive choice of court agreements. 
B.  Further Work and the Judgments                                             
Convention 
In October 2011, the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague 
Conference established an Experts’ Group to consider the resumption of the 
Judgments Project.20  There was a desire on the part of some delegations to return 
 
 13. Commission II: Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Summary 
of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6–20 
June 2001, Interim Text (June 20, 2001), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm2001draft_e.pdf. 
 14. HCCH, Preliminary Result of the Work of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project, 
Prel. Doc. No. 8 (Mar. 2003) (corrected), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pd08e.pdf. 
 15. HCCH: Final Act [of the Twentieth Session] (June 30, 2005), https://assets.hcch. 
net/upload/finalact20e.pdf.  The Final Act included a modification to the Hague Conference Statute 
allowing Regional Economic Integration Organizations (the E.U.) to become Members of the 
Conference.  The text of the Choice of Court Convention, and a documentary history, are available on 
the Hague Conference website at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/specialised-sections/choice-of-
court. 
   16.  Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. For a more complete discussion of the Choice of Court Convention, see BRAND & HERRUP, supra 
note 4. 
 20. See The Judgements Project, THE WORLD ORG. FOR CROSS–BORDER CO–OPERATION IN CIVIL & 
COMMERCIAL MATTERS (2020), https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments. 
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to the original project and again draft a convention that would deal both with direct 
jurisdiction in the court of origin and with the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments.21  In 2012, the Council split these two objectives when it established a 
Working Group to prepare proposals for a judgments convention and directed the 
Experts’ Group to give further study to a separate jurisdiction convention.22  The 
Working Group completed a Proposed Draft Text of a judgments convention in 
2016, and the Council established a Special Commission to move the text forward.23  
The Experts’ Group was instructed to move forward on a jurisdiction convention 
only after the Judgments Convention text was concluded.24  Special Commission 
meetings for a Judgments Convention were held in June 2016, February 2017, 
November 2017, and May 2018.  A Diplomatic Session began on June 18, 2019 and 
concluded on July 2 with the signing of the Final Act creating the Hague Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil or Commercial 
Matters.25 
III.  THE CONTEXT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF E.U.                                       
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS FROM 1992 TO 2019 
Like Rudolf Schlesinger and Arthur von Mehren, I will here consider the 
traditional comparative method distinction between common law and civil law legal 
systems.  While other types of legal systems do, of course, exist, and should be 
considered in any comprehensive general study, the negotiations at the Hague 
Conference demonstrated a predominance of importance of the U.S. common law 
legal system and the European civil law legal system.  While other civil law states 
tended to line up behind continental Europe on most issues, it was not always true, 
however, that other common law states lined up behind the U.S.  In particular, the 
United Kingdom (“U.K.”), as a late–joining Member State of the European 
Economic Community (later called the “European Community” and now the 
“European Union”), tended to align more closely with its continental European civil 
law partners in the legal instruments that initially were written before the U.K. 
joined the European experiment. 
A comparison of the development of the law of jurisdiction and the law of 
judgments recognition, as well as developments in legal institutions, from 1992 
until 2019 demonstrates both convergence and divergence in legal systems.  Those 
developments help us understand the choices made in the course of the negotiation 
of both the 2005 and 2019 Conventions and consider what steps, if any, might be 
appropriate following the 2019 Convention. 
A.  The E.U. Picture in 1992 
When the Hague negotiations began in 1992, “Europe” as an entity was not a 
player in the negotiations themselves.  The original six Member States of the 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. The Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Civil or Commercial Matters was the Final Act of the Diplomatic Session.  Available at 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=137 (last visited Mar. 28). 
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European Economic Community,26 established under the Treaty of Rome in 1958, 
had been joined by Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1971, Greece in 
1980, and Spain and Portugal in 1984.27  These were the Member States when the 
Treaty of Maastricht on European Union (“TEU”) was signed on February 7, 1992 
and then entered into force on November 1, 1993.28  They were all Member States 
of the HCCH when the jurisdiction and judgments negotiations began in 1992 and, 
along with the sixteen states destined to join the E.U. later,29 participated as 
individual Hague Conference Member States in the negotiations.30 
B. The Evolution of E.U. Competence31 
In order to understand the development of the law of jurisdiction and judgments 
recognition in Europe during the course of the Hague negotiations, it is also 
necessary to understand the evolution of European institutions—particularly during 
that period, but also dating back to the creation of the European Economic 
Community (“EEC”).  When the EEC was created in 1957, the original six Member 
States realized that private international law plays an important role in, and thus 
overlaps with, trade law.  This realization is demonstrated in particular in Article 
220 of the Treaty of Rome, a treaty otherwise focused primarily on the development 
of rules to enhance the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people.32  
Article 20 declared that the Member States of the Community should:  
[E]nter into [further] negotiations with each other with a view to securing 
for the benefit of their nationals . . . the simplification of formalities 
governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of 
courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.33   
A decade later, the EEC Member States concluded the 1968 Brussels 
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters,34 carrying out the mandate contained in Article 220 
 
 26. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands.  THE 
HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2020). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, and Slovenia joined in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007; and Croatia joined in 
2013.  Id. 
 30. For the dates on which each of these states became a Member of the Hague Conference, see Status 
Table, Statute of the HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=29 
(last updated Mar. 4, 2020). 
 31. Portions of this Section are based on Ronald A. Brand, Of Magnets and Centrifuges: The U.S. and 
E.U. Federal Systems and Private International Law, in COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM, INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPLEXITY, AND POLICY CHOICE (Jae-Jae Spoon & Nils Ringe eds., forthcoming 2020). 
 32. Treaty of Rome, art. 220, Mar. 25, 1957, 294 U.N.T.S. 126. 
 33. Id. at art. 293 (ex art. 220) [hereinafter TEC] (establishing the European Community).  The current 
version of the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty that established the European Community, can be found at 
O.J. 321E/37, 29 Dec., 2006, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.CE.20
06.321.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2006:321E:TOC. 
 34. European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (Brussels Convention), concluded September 27, 1968, 41 O.J. 27/1 (EC) (consolidated and 
updated version of the 1968 Convention and the Protocol of 1971, following the 1996 accession of the 
6
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the Treaty of Rome.35  The Brussels Convention recognized the importance of 
jurisdictional decisions in the process of recognition of judgments, ultimately 
providing for both rules of direct jurisdiction in the court of origin and rules on the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in other EEC Member States.36 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, concluded in 1997,37 provided in Article 61 that “the 
Council shall adopt . . . measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters 
as provided for in Article 65.”38  Article 65 then stated that this authority existed for 
purposes of service of process, taking of evidence, the recognition of judgments, 
rules of conflict of laws and jurisdiction, and rules of civil procedure.39  Thus, while 
Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome had addressed one element of private 
international law (the recognition of foreign judgments) by prodding the Member 
States to take an international law (treaty) approach to the matter, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam addressed the full package of private international law, transferring 
competence for these issues from the Member States to the E.U. institutions, and 
addressing the result through internal E.U. legislation.40 
The Treaty of Amsterdam led to the creation of a number of regulations and 
directives that moved private international law rules from Member State codes of 
private international law to E.U. regulations and directives.41  While there was 
debate about whether this process of centralized internal rules of private 
international law would also apply to the development of rules regarding external 
relations, that doubt was eliminated with the 2003 Lugano Convention opinion of 
the European Court of Justice, which held that authority for such matters resided 
exclusively with the institutions in Brussels—at least for the jurisdiction and 
judgments matters dealt with in the revised Lugano Convention.42  A 1999 Opinion 
of the European Council Legal Service stated:  
 
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, and the Kingdom of Sweden) [hereinafter Brussels 
Convention]. 
 35. TEC, supra note 33, at art. 293. 
 36. For a discussion of the rationale for including private international law rules under the rubric of a 
trade law regime, see Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The 
Economics of Private International Law, in THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 592 (J. 
Bhandari & A. O. Sykes eds., 1998).  For a more personal description of the evolutionary developments 
in the E.U. on this matter, see Brand, supra note 31. 
 37. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities, and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1. 
 38. TEC, supra note 33, at art. 61 (ex art. 73i). 
 39. Id. at art. 65 (ex art. 73m). 
 40. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities, and Certain Related Acts, supra note 37. 
 41. See Aude Fiorini, The Evolution of European Private International Law, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
969, 973 (2008). 
 42. See generally Case 1/03, Opinion pursuant to Article 300(6) EC, 2003 E.C.R. I–1145.  The opinion 
procedure under Article 300(6) is used occasionally and is separate from the normal “case” procedure 
by which most matters reach the European Court of Justice.  The Lugano Convention originally was 
developed to extend the rules of the Brussels Convention beyond the confines of the European 
Community to the Member States of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).  Completed in 1988, 
its provisions generally track those of the Brussels Convention, setting up a parallel regime for 
jurisdiction and judgments recognition.  As most of the EFTA Member States have not joined the E.U., 
the importance of the Lugano Convention has been diminished.  It remains in effect for relationships 
between E.U. Member States and Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.  With the changes to internal rules 
brought about by the Brussels I Regulation, parallel changes were proposed to the Lugano Convention.  
Because competence for those rules internally had shifted in the interim from the E.U. Member States 
to the Community institutions, there was lack of clarity on whether the Member States or the Community 
held the external competence to become a party to the Lugano Convention.  This question was submitted 
7
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[O]nce the Community has exercised its internal competences adopting 
positions by which common rules are fixed [pursuant to Article 65 of the 
ECT], the Community competence becomes exclusive, in the sense that 
the Member States lose the right to contract, individually and even 
collectively, obligations with third countries which affect the said rules.43  
Relying upon this language, as well as the 1971 ERTA/AETR decision,44 as further 
developed in the Open Skies judgments of 2002,45 the Court stated that: 
[W]henever the Community has included in its internal legislative acts 
provisions relating to the treatment of nationals of non–member countries 
or expressly conferred on its institutions powers to negotiate with non–
member countries, it acquires an exclusive external competence in the 
spheres covered by those acts46 . . . [and t]he same applies, even in the 
absence of any express provision authorising its institutions to negotiate 
with non–member countries, where the Community has achieved complete 
harmonisation in a given area.47 . . .  [Thus, t]he conclusion of the new 
Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters . . . falls entirely within the 
sphere of exclusive competence of the European Community.48 
The Lugano Convention Opinion laid to rest any claim of remaining 
competence with the Member States for external relations on matters of jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments, as well as, effectively, for any 
other area of private international law and judicial cooperation covered by TEC 
Article 65. 
C.  E.U. Competence and the                                                                
Hague Negotiations 
At the Hague Conference, this evolution of competence transfer played out in 
the way the text of the Choice of Court and Judgments Conventions were 
negotiated.  While the Hague process had begun in the early 1990’s with each 
current and future E.U. Member State playing an active and separate role in the 
negotiations, this changed as competence moved to the E.U. institutions.  
 
to the European Court of Justice for clarification).  See also Case 01/03 Opinion pursuant to Article 
300(6), 2003 E.C.R. I–1145 at ¶¶ 17–19 (an explanation of the Lugano Convention); A. Borrás, The 
Effect of the Adoption of Brussels I and Rome I on the External Competences of the EC and the Member 
States, in ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 99–100 (J. 
Meeusen & M. Pertegás, G. Straetmans eds., 2004). 
 43. See Borrás, supra note 42. 
 44. Case 22/70, Judgment of 31 Mar. 1971, Comm’n v. Council [1971] E.C.R. 263 (European Rail 
Transport Agreement (ERTA/AETR) Case) (“AETR” is the French acronym). 
 45. Case C–467/98, Comm’n v. Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. I–9519; Case C–468/98 Comm’n v. Sweden, 
2002 E.C.R. I–9575; Case C–469/98, Comm’n v. Finland, 2002 E.C.R. I–9627; Case C–471/98, 
Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I–9681; Case C–472/98 Comm’n v. Luxembourg, 2002 E.C.R. I–
9741; Case C–475/98, Comm’n v. Austria, 2002 E.C.R. I–9797; Case C–476/98, Comm’n v. Germany, 
2002 E.C.R. I–9855. 
 46. Case C–467/98, Comm’n v. Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. I–9519, I–9556–57, ¶ 82. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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Interestingly, the private international law experts in the Hague Conference seemed 
quite unaware of any planned transfer of competence being negotiated by the trade 
lawyers in Brussels.49  The “observers” from the European Commission who had 
sat in the back of the room became European Council personnel sitting primarily 
with the delegation of the Member State then holding the Presidency of the Council, 
and ultimately (after the Lugano Opinion) to European Commission personnel 
sitting with the Member State holding the Presidency, but controlling the 
negotiations.50  Each morning, the E.U. Member State and E.U. institution delegates 
would “coordinate” before negotiations began to determine who would speak on 
what issues and what their position would be.  Thus, what began with as many as 
twenty–eight Hague Conference Member States espousing as many as twenty–eight 
positions (although generally in line with one another) turned to a single voice 
representing the entire E.U. 
The Final Act of June 30, 2005, which concluded the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements, also included an amendment to the Statute of the 
HCCH, authorizing Conference membership not only by states but also by Regional 
Economic Integration Organizations (i.e., by the European Union).51  This allowed 
the E.U. to become a party to the Choice of Court Convention directly, as well as a 
Member of the Hague Conference, making the Convention effective in all of the 
E.U. Member States (except Denmark and the United Kingdom).52  When the later 
negotiations began on a Judgments Convention, the E.U. delegates represented the 
E.U. as a full Member of the Hague Conference. 
One of the results of this evolution in competence was a very close correlation 
between the internal E.U. rules on jurisdiction and judgments recognition found in 
the Brussels I Regulation and the proposals made by the E.U. (and its Member 
States) for rules in the conventions being negotiated at the Hague Conference.  
Thus, for comparison purposes, it is useful to follow the development of the law on 
both jurisdiction and judgments recognition in the E.U. and the U.S. during the 
period of the negotiations.  Such a process of comparative study is also useful in 
assessing whether, after completion of a Choice of Court Convention and a 
Judgments Convention, it makes sense to return to efforts to adopt global rules on 
direct jurisdiction as well. 
D.  The Evolution of E.U. Legal Instruments on                           
Jurisdiction and Judgments Recognition 
The 1968 European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the Brussels I 
Convention) responded to Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome by setting forth rules 
in Member State courts applicable to jurisdiction in cases involving foreign 
defendants and to the recognition of judgments from the courts of other Member 
States.53  This set of rules for both direct jurisdiction and judgments recognition has 
 
 49. See Brand, Of Magnets and Centrifuges, supra note 31. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Council 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 3, 5–25 (consolidated version). 
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largely carried forward into the 2001 Brussels I Regulation and the 2012 Brussels I 
(Recast) Regulation. 
IV.   THE CONTEXT: E.U. AND U.S. LAW                                                               
ON JURISDICTION AND THE                                                                          
RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS 
As the discussion above indicates, there was dramatic evolution of the context 
for the rules on jurisdiction and judgments within Europe during the course of the 
Hague negotiations that led to the Choice of Court and Judgments Conventions.  
Understanding that context aids in understanding the developments in the law itself, 
to which I now turn. 
A.  Jurisdiction 
1.  The European Union 
The current system of European Union law governing jurisdictional rules, in 
particular when a case involves a defendant from another E.U. Member State, 
provides a mostly civil law comparison with U.S. jurisdiction rules.  That system is 
now codified in a Community Regulation commonly referred to as the Brussels I 
(Recast) Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters.54  The Brussels I (Recast) Regulation 
amended the Brussels I Regulation of 2001 and became effective on January 10, 
2015.55  The jurisdictional rules are found in Chapter II of the Regulation, with 
Chapter III covering issues of recognition and enforcement.56 
The jurisdictional rules found in Chapter II of the Brussels I (Recast) 
Regulation begin with the rule of general jurisdiction found in Article 4: “persons 
domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts 
of that Member State.”57  This provides the foundation of jurisdiction under the 
Brussels system.  The important personal nexus is domicile, and a defendant may 
be sued in his state of domicile on any claim, no matter where that claim arose.58 
Article 5 of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation limits the available bases of 
jurisdiction when suing a defendant domiciled in a Member State to those found in 
Chapter II of the Regulation.59  It also (by reference to an Annex) specifically 
prohibits suit on bases of jurisdiction that exist in Member States but are considered 
to be exorbitant under E.U. law.60  Article 6 then operates effectively to discriminate 
 
 54. See generally Regulation (E.U.) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1, 1–32 (current codification of E.U. law governing jurisdiction 
rules that is sometimes referred to as the “Brussels Ibis Regulation”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 7–17. 
 57. Id. at 7. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Regulation (E.U.) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1, 7. 
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against defendants domiciled outside the E.U. by specifically allowing jurisdiction 
based on those exorbitant national law bases of jurisdiction and extending them to 
all plaintiffs domiciled in the state in which the action is brought.61 
While the general jurisdiction rule in Article 4 is found at the beginning of the 
Brussels I (Recast) Regulation, the hierarchy of jurisdictional rules is not best 
understood by reading from the start to the end of the Regulation.  Rules found early 
in the Regulation often can be trumped by rules located at a later point in the text.  
The general hierarchical structure of the convention is as follows: 
1. Article 24 provides for exclusive jurisdiction in certain types of cases, 
usually dealing with property rights that are territorial in nature and 
creating jurisdiction in the state in which the property is located or 
created.  If such exclusive jurisdiction exists, then no other rule need 
be consulted. 
2. Articles 10–23 provide special rules designed to protect the party 
considered to be at a negotiating disadvantage in insurance (Arts. 10–
17), consumer (Arts. 17–19), and employment (Arts. 10–23) 
contracts.  These rules generally allow the “weaker” party to sue in its 
home court and prohibit pre–dispute choice of court agreements. 
3. Article 25 provides respect for party autonomy (except in insurance, 
consumer, and employment contracts) by stating that, when one or 
more of the parties is domiciled in a Member State, the court chosen 
by agreement of the parties shall have exclusive jurisdiction. 
4. If neither the exclusive jurisdiction rules of Article 24, nor the 
“prorogation” rule of Article 25, applies, and the matter does not 
involve an insurance, consumer, or employment contract, then 
jurisdiction always exists under Article 4 in the courts of the state of 
the defendant’s domicile. 
5. Articles 7–9 provide “special jurisdiction” rules that allow suit to be 
brought in a forum additional to that of the defendant’s state of 
domicile.  Article 8(1) deals with jurisdiction over multiple defendants 
and authorizes jurisdiction over a foreign defendant domiciled in the 
E.U. without other connection to the forum state, so long as one of the 
other defendants is subject to jurisdiction under another provision of 
the Regulation.  Article 9 is limited to jurisdiction over claims 
involving the use or operation of a ship. 
The structure of the Regulation makes Article 7 the most important source of 
special jurisdiction rules that authorize jurisdiction in a court other than one in the 
state in which the defendant is domiciled.  This, of course, generates a certain level 
of forum shopping by allowing the plaintiff a choice of where to bring the suit if 
any one or more of the seven separate jurisdictional provisions of Article 7 applies.  
Each of those seven provisions generally requires a connection between the forum 
 
 61. Id. 
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state and the cause of action.  They provide for special jurisdiction in matters of 
contract; tort; civil claims in criminal proceedings; recovery of cultural objects; 
disputes arising out of a branch, agency of establishment; trusts; and cargo 
salvage.62 
The Brussels I (Recast) Regulation thus creates a relatively clear set of rules 
when a European defendant is involved.  They begin with general jurisdiction at the 
state of the domicile of the defendant and add special jurisdiction rules based on 
fairly rigid court–claim connections.  The rules found in the Brussels I (Recast) 
Regulation are, for the most part, the same as those which existed under the Brussels 
I Convention at the outset of the Hague negotiations in 1992.  Like the Regulation, 
the rules of jurisdiction in most Member States are codified in a manner that is 
generally clear and centralized. 
While the Regulation is exclusive and exhaustive (i.e., it provides the only 
jurisdictional rules available when a defendant is domiciled in another Member 
State, and no other basis of jurisdiction may be asserted as to those defendants), 
other basis of jurisdiction which exist in Member States (but which are thus 
considered to be exorbitant in the intra–European context) remain available for use 
against defendants domiciled outside the E.U.63  In addition to these rules of 
exorbitant jurisdiction that remain applicable to external defendants under Articles 
5 and 6, the other jurisdictional rules in the Brussels I Regulation generally exist in 
each Member State as applicable against non–Member State defendants—either as 
a result of effective restatement of those provisions or through blanket 
incorporation.64  Thus, defendants from outside the E.U. are effectively subject to 
the rules of the Regulation, as well as additional plaintiff–friendly jurisdictional 
provisions of national law.  Examples of some of the exorbitant jurisdiction rules 
excluded from application against defendants domiciled in E.U. Member States are 
Article 14 of the French Civil Code,65 which provides for jurisdiction based on the 
nationality of the plaintiff, and Article 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure,66 
which provides for general jurisdiction over a defendant as a result of the presence 
of any property of that defendant in the forum district (no matter what the value). 
2.  Jurisdiction: The United States 
Compared to the European Union, jurisdictional rules in the United States have 
seen rather dramatic change from 1992 to the present.  In order to understand those 
changes, a brief bit of background is helpful. 
The question of personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts begins with the application 
of state “long–arm” statutes that, like the Brussels regime in Europe, set out the 
basic rules of jurisdiction in each state.  Even in federal court, the jurisdiction statute 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., Andrea Girardina, Law Reforming the Italian System of Private International Law, 35 
INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 760 n.218 (1996) (English trans.) (information regarding Articles 3 and 4 of 
the 1995 law). 
 65. CIVIL CODE art. 14 (Fr.).  See also CIVIL CODE art. 14 (Belg.); C. CIV. art. 14 (Lux.) (which provide 
for similar rules as the French Code); Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 
58 ME. L. REV. 474, 483 (2006) (“The French are not alone in basing their brand of exorbitant 
jurisdiction on the plaintiff’s nationality.”). 
 66. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 23 (Ger.), translation at https://www.geset
ze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html#p0075 (last visited May 5, 2020). 
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of the state in which the federal district court sits governs personal jurisdiction in 
most cases as a result of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “borrowing” the state 
statute.67  This prevents different jurisdictional results when a case may be brought 
in either state or federal court. 
If there is jurisdiction under the state statute, then the court follows with a 
determination of whether that jurisdiction nonetheless complies with the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution.  The Due Process Clauses provide limitations on the federal and state 
governments.  They exist to protect individuals from excessive exercises of 
governmental authority.68  In a discussion of judicial jurisdiction, this means that 
Due Process restricts the extent to which courts may exercise jurisdiction over a 
defendant.69  
In the 1877 case of Pennoyer v. Neff,70 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause—the one most often applied in 
cross–border litigation—requires a territorial approach to personal jurisdiction over 
a defendant, looking first to whether the defendant is within the territory of the 
forum state.71  Later Supreme Court cases developed the contours of Due Process 
jurisdictional analysis.  In 1940, Milliken v. Meyer72 determined that domicile 
within the forum state was alone sufficient to establish general jurisdiction, whether 
or not the defendant was currently present within the state.  In the 1945 case of 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,73 the Court recognized that the development 
of the corporate form of legal person, along with modern methods of transportation 
and communication, required the recognition that corporations may well be 
“present” in multiple states when they were engaged in continuous and systematic 
business activity in each of those states so as to create the minimum contacts 
necessary to satisfy due process.  In the 1980 case of World–Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson,74 the Court reasserted due process as a limitation on jurisdiction 
where the defendant had neither presence within the forum state nor any activities 
in or directed at that state.  In the 1984 case of Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,75 the Court for the first time clearly delineated between 
general and specific jurisdiction, and in 1985 the Court applied the due process 
minimum contacts analysis to contractual relationships in Burger King Corp. v. 
 
 67. Jurisdiction in the federal courts is governed by Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
This Rule provides three principal jurisdictional authorizations: Rule 4(k)(1)(A) authorizes a district 
court to borrow the jurisdictional powers of state courts in the state where it is located; Rule 4(k)(1)(C) 
confirms the availability of any applicable federal statute granting personal jurisdiction; and Rule 4(k)(2) 
grants district courts personal jurisdiction to the limits of the Fifth Amendment due process clause in 
certain federal question cases.  GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 193 (4th ed. 2007).  This most often results in the federal court “borrowing” 
the state statute under Rule 4(k)(1)(A).  Id. at 193–219. 
 68. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (finding that “history reflects the traditional 
and common–sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta[,] . . . was 
intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”). 
 69. See Ronald A. Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction, and a Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. PITT 
L. REV. 661 (1999). 
 70. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 71. Id. at 722. 
 72. 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
 73. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 74. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 75. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
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Rudzewicz.76  This common law development of jurisdictional rules meant that the 
law was never as clear or as centralized as was the case with jurisdictional rules in 
Europe.  It resulted in an evolutionary development of limitations on jurisdiction 
through a focus on the defendant’s activity in and directed at the forum state, as 
well as the relationship between that activity and the cause of action in the specific 
case. 
The most dramatic change in U.S. law on jurisdiction has been the narrowing 
of the concept of general jurisdiction, due largely to two U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions in 2011 and 2014.77  In the Goodyear78 and Daimler79 cases, Justice 
Ginsburg, writing in each case for a unanimous Court, limited the earlier concept 
of jurisdiction over a legal person resulting from that entity’s continuous and 
systematic activity within the forum state to activity that demonstrates the defendant 
is “at home” in that state—a concept equivalent to that of domicile for a natural 
person.  Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg’s opinions in these cases included reference 
to the Brussels I jurisdictional framework in the E.U.80 
When it is specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction, that is involved, recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence is not so clear.  In J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro,81 decided the same day as Goodyear in 2011, the Court maintained 
significant limitations on jurisdiction over foreign defendants, requiring more than 
just a connection between the injury to the plaintiff and the cause of action.  The 
court maintained a requirement of a clear connection between the defendant and the 
forum state, with Justice Ginsburg relegated to a dissent in which she argued for the 
much broader special jurisdiction approach found in the E.U.82 
3.  Jurisdiction and the Hague                                                    
Negotiations 
When the Hague negotiations began in the early 1990s, most other Hague 
Conference Member States had as one of their primary goals changing what they 
saw as a very expansive rule of general jurisdiction in the U.S.  This change was 
accomplished, but not through negotiations.  The U.S. Supreme Court unilaterally 
gave those states what they wanted in its Goodyear and Daimler decisions. 
 
 76. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 77. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 78. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. 
 79. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122. 
 80. Id. at 141 (“In the European Union, for example, a corporation may generally be sued in the nation 
in which it is ‘domiciled,’ a term defined to refer only to the location of the corporation’s ‘statutory seat,’ 
‘central administration,’ or ‘principal place of business.’”). 
 81. 564 U.S. 873. 
 82. Id. at 909 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s judgment also puts United States plaintiffs at a 
disadvantage in comparison to similarly situated complainants elsewhere in the world.  Of particular 
note, within the European Union, in which the United Kingdom is a participant, the jurisdiction New 
Jersey would have exercised is not at all exceptional.  The European Regulation on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments provides for the exercise of specific jurisdiction ‘in matters 
relating to tort . . . in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred.’”). 
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B.  Judgments Recognition 
1.  The European Union 
Internally, the Brussels I system has made the free circulation of judgments a 
rather simple matter.  Article 35(1) of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation states: “A 
judgment given in a Member State shall be recognized in the other Member States 
without any special procedure being required.”83  Because control of jurisdiction is 
accomplished in the court of origin, through Chapter II of the Regulation, no rules 
of indirect jurisdiction are required in order to test the incoming judgment.  Any 
challenge to the jurisdiction in the court of origin must be raised in that court. 
For judgments from outside the E.U., the law remains that of each Member 
State.  This results in de–centralization and a variety of approaches.  Germany and 
Italy, for example, incorporate their direct rules of jurisdiction as their indirect rules 
of jurisdiction.84  Thus, any jurisdictional basis that is good for bringing a case 
within the jurisdiction is also good for testing a judgment from abroad.  The United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, has a much longer list of jurisdictional bases for 
bringing an original action against a foreign defendant than it allows for testing 
judgments from foreign courts.  Each Member State controls its rules for judgments 
from outside the E.U.85 
2.  The United States 
In the U.S., internal judgments recognition among the states is governed by the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause found in Article IV of the United States Constitution.86  
Section 1 of that Article provides: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”87  
Implemented through 28 U.S.C. § 1738, this provision extends to all judgments 
from within the U.S., whether from state or federal courts. 
For external judgments, U.S. judgments recognition law began as federal 
common law, evolved to state common law, and is now largely found in one of two 
uniform acts that have been adopted in more than two–thirds of the states.88  In the 
1895 case of Hilton v. Guyot,89 the Supreme Court applied general principles of 
international law to determine that, as a matter of federal law, a French judgment 
would be judged through a comity analysis that begins by giving deference to the 
foreign decision.  While the Court held the judgment was not entitled to recognition 
because of a lack of reciprocity with France, that element of the decision has largely 
 
 83. Commission Regulation 1215/2012, art. 36, 2012 O.J. 
 84. See Ronald A. Brand, New Challenges in the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments (Univ. 
of Pitt. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018–29), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3246053. 
 85. For further elaboration on the E.U. Member State rules regarding the recognition of external 
judgments, see Ronald A. Brand, The Circulation of Judgments Under the Draft Hague Judgments 
Convention, SSRN (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3334647. 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Ronald A. Brand, Federal Judicial Center International Litigation Guide: Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (2013). 
 89. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
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been ignored, with a comity analysis being applied in both state and federal courts.90  
After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,91 the substantive law of judgments recognition has 
largely become state law.  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws promulgated two judgments recognition laws for adoption by the states: 
the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money–Judgments Recognition Act92 and the 2005 
Uniform Foreign–Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.93  The second is 
largely an update of the earlier Act, with one or the other of the two Acts now 
adopted in more than two–thirds of the states. 
V.  THE COMPARISON 
A comparison is possible for both the legal structure and the resulting rules for 
judgments recognition in the E.U. and the U.S. 
A.  Comparing E.U. and U.S.                                                                 
Legal Systems 
On the structural side, the E.U. system internally for both jurisdiction and for 
judgments recognition is centralized and predictable with code–type rules found in 
the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation.  Externally, the matter is more dispersed and 
diverse, with each Member State having its own set of rules for both jurisdiction 
and judgments recognition, unhindered by E.U. regulation. 
In the U.S., internal matters of both jurisdiction and judgments recognition are 
a constitutional matter, with jurisdiction governed by the Due Process Clauses and 
judgments recognition governed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV.  
For jurisdiction, the same constitutional principles protect foreign nation defendants 
as protect foreign state defendants.  Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clauses apply to “persons,” not citizens, so they extend their protections to 
those beyond our borders for jurisdictional purposes.94 
External judgments recognition in the U.S. is like that in Europe in that it is 
governed by state law, without central coordination except to the extent that a treaty 
may apply.  In the U.S., judgments recognition has common law origins that have 
been replaced in most states by uniform statutes.  Unlike in Europe, however, 
because federal courts in the U.S. have subject matter jurisdiction in diversity cases 
involving a foreign party95 and apply state substantive law in such cases, it is often 
in federal court decisions that we find the interpretation and application of state law 
on judgments recognition. 
 
 90. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). 
 91. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 92. UNIFORM FOREIGN–COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1962). 
 93. UNIFORM FOREIGN–COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2005). 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 95. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2011). 
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B.  Comparing E.U. and U.S. Law 
For the comparison of the law, it is useful to separate jurisdiction and 
judgments recognition. 
1.  Jurisdiction 
Internally, the E.U. jurisdictional rules applicable to foreign defendants from 
other Member States consist of a simple focus on the domicile of the defendant for 
purposes of general jurisdiction and a set of special jurisdiction rules based on a 
connection between the court and the claim.  Externally, the rules are diverse and 
non–uniform, with jurisdictional bases that other Member States consider to be 
exorbitant, and thus prohibited in their use as against defendants from other Member 
States, but available for use against defendants domiciled outside the E.U. 
In the U.S., rules of jurisdiction are ultimately tested against the Due Process 
Clauses, regardless of whether the defendant is from within or without the U.S.  
That has not, however, led to clarity of analysis or predictability of results.  Recent 
decisions have seen the U.S. concept of general jurisdiction evolve to be largely in 
line with the European concept of domicile as the principal test.  This means that 
activity–based concepts of general jurisdiction focused on continuous and 
systematic activity within the forum state have narrowed to a simple place of 
“home” or domicile test.  At the same time, however, rules of specific jurisdiction 
have continued to provide broader protection for foreign defendants than is 
available in Europe through the requirement of a three–way nexus connecting the 
forum state with both the defendant and the cause of action, with the principal focus 
being on the forum state–defendant connection. 
2.  Judgments Recognition 
In Europe, the law of judgments recognition is both centralized and predictable 
for purposes of internal judgment circulation.  For external judgments, however, the 
law is more diverse, based on Member State law generally found in code–type rules.  
There are a variety of approaches, with some Member States96 applying the same 
tests for both direct jurisdiction in their own courts and indirect jurisdiction analysis 
of the foreign decision.  Other Member States97 allow much broader bases of direct 
jurisdiction while maintaining narrow bases for purposes of indirect jurisdiction. 
In the U.S., internal judgments recognition is both easy and predictable, based 
on Constitutional principles uniformly interpreted and applied.  External judgments 
recognition, while based on state law, has become highly uniform, primarily 
through the evolution of uniform acts.  Substantively, the result has been a quite 
liberal regime of judgments recognition throughout the U.S. 
 
 96. Brand, New Challenges in the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 84, at 20. 
 97. Id. 
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C.  Comparative Method and the                                               
International System 
The success of the 2005 and 2019 Hague Conventions will depend on how 
widely the ratifications and accessions become for each of them.  With the twenty–
eight Member States of the E.U., Mexico, Montenegro, and Singapore now parties, 
the 2005 Convention has a foundation for growth in this regard.  While the 2019 
Convention has been hailed as a “game changer,”98 whether that assessment will 
prove true remains subject to the level of ratification and accession.  If both the E.U. 
and the U.S. become parties to both Conventions, many more states will likely join 
in. 
In terms of legal rules, both Conventions will result in a move from divergent 
laws to uniform rules, including a rule calling for uniform interpretation in each 
Convention.99  The 2005 Convention100 is simple at its core, with the following 
rules: 
Article 5: “The court or courts of a Contracting State designated in an 
exclusive choice of court agreement shall have jurisdiction.” 
Article 6: “A court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen 
court shall suspend or dismiss proceedings.” 
Article 8: “A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated 
in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall be recognised and enforced 
in other Contracting States.” 
The 2019 Convention101 evidences similar simplicity at the core: 
Article 4: “A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State (State of 
origin) shall be recognised and enforced in another Contracting State.” 
Article 5: “A judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if one 
of the following requirements is met.” 
Article 7: Bases for non–recognition of a judgment. 
The apparent simplicity of the 2019 Convention is potentially misleading with 
the thirteen separate tests of indirect jurisdiction given in Article 5(1).102  Whether 
that list, which diverges from those states which engage in a simple mirror–image 
 
 98. Gamechanger for Cross–Border Litigation in Civil & Commercial Matters to be Finalized in the 
Hague, HCCH (June 18, 2019), https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=683. 
 99. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, concluded June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294; 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, 
concluded on February 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249. 
 100. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, concluded June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294. 
 101. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=137 (last visited Mar. 28). 
 102. Id.  For a discussion of the complexity created by the large list of indirect jurisdiction rules, see 
Brand, Circulation of Judgments, supra note 85. 
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approach to direct and indirect jurisdictional bases, will lead to uniformity of 
practice, remains to be seen. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
A comprehensive comparative study of international litigation would require a 
book rather than an article.  The discussion above is more limited.  It reflects the 
perspective of my involvement for more than twenty–five years in the negotiations 
at the HCCH that have resulted in the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the 
2019 Judgments Convention.  This involvement identifies both where I stand when 
I engage in this study and what I have considered in the process.  Using the 
negotiations and their results as context provides an opportunity to consider both 
the law as it existed at the beginning and the end of those negotiations, as well as 
the legal systems and institutions that were important to the negotiations.  It also 
demonstrates that the evolution of legal systems and institutions has been as 
important as the evolution of the law itself. 
From where I stand, what I have chosen to observe for purposes of this limited 
study, and how I have considered both the evolution of the law and the legal systems 
involved, I come to several conclusions.  First, other Hague Conference Member 
States entered the Hague negotiations in the early 1990’s hoping to get a convention 
that allowed a clear path to transactional planning so that businesses from those 
states could avoid U.S. jurisdiction, particularly general jurisdiction.  While they 
did not achieve that goal through negotiations, the United States Supreme Court has 
unilaterally provided that result in its Goodyear and Daimler decisions.  Thus, 
changes in U.S. law, and considerations of the institutions in which those changes 
were hoped for and those institutions in which they did occur, demonstrate that 
sometimes the law evolves in ways other than those in which we might expect. 
Second, the comparison of legal systems demonstrates developments in the 
E.U. have made it a civil law magnet system, in part because it is the traditional 
legal system model for most of the other Hague Conference Member States 
throughout the world.  This is facilitated further by the fact that the law of 
jurisdiction and judgments recognition in the E.U. (at least internally) is predictable, 
centralized, and easily adapted to treaty text.  The U.S. common law system, on the 
other hand, presents a decentralized, fragmented system that relies largely on 
evolving case law that is not easily adapted to treaty text. 
Third, the U.S. and E.U. legal systems met in the Hague negotiations with 
different starting points and different agendas for change through the treaties being 
negotiated.  Nevertheless, both desired, encouraged, and achieved progress in 
enhancing private party autonomy and freedom of contract.  When combined with 
legal developments on choice of law in the E.U. and at the Hague Conference,103 
the 2005 and 2019 Hague Conventions are part of a movement toward honoring 
party autonomy and freedom of contract as a fundamental rule of private 
international law. 
 
 103. See, e.g., Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, art. 5, concluded June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 
1294; Hague Conference on Private International Law, Principles on Choice of Law in International 
Commercial Contracts, adopted March 19, 2015, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-
text/?cid=135; Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 17, 
2008, On the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L. 177) 10. 
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Finally, continuing differences in U.S. and E.U. law on special/specific 
jurisdiction make a direct jurisdiction convention unlikely, unless there would be 
global acceptance of U.S. concepts of due process (or a convention without the 
United States).  Moreover, with the 2005 and 2019 Conventions, there is little, if 
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